Menangani Firaunisme

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Dalam buku Tugas Cendikiawan Muslim, penulis dan pemikir terkenal dari Iran, Ali Shariati (1933-1975) menegaskan betapa ada “triniti sosial” yang selalu bergabung dalam melakukan penindasan dalam masyarakat. Firaun (kuasa), Bal’am (agamawan) dan Qarun (harta) merupakan tiga individu di dalam al-Quran yang telah dihuraikan oleh Shariati sebagai pewaris legasi Qabilian dalam pergelutan antara haq dan batil, keadilan dan kezaliman. Antara ketiga-tiga simbol kezaliman tersebut, saya berminat menghuraikan mengenai simbol kekuasan dan politik iaitu Firaun, memandangkan menerusi perbincangan ini kita juga bisa melihat penyalahgunaan agama dan pemonopolian harta.

Firaunism dan agama

Ramai yang seolah-olah tersilap faham mengenai hubungan antara Firaun dan agama, disebabkan Firaun sepertimana telah disebut dalam al-Quran dan juga Bible merupakan watak seorang raja yang menolak ajaran seorang Rasul.

Namun demikian, jangan kita lupa apa yang tersirat dalam pemerintahan dan pengamalan kasta pada zaman Firaun, sistem kasta piramid sosial sebagaimana bisa ditemui dalam banyak tulisan dan buku kajian mengenai tamadun purba Mesir menunjukkan bahawa kumpulan pendeta dan bangsawan (high priests and nobles ) pada zaman itu merupakan penghuni kelas yang ketiga selepas Firaun dan penasihatnya (Vizier, Haman merupakan vizier kepada Firaun pada zaman Musa as). Vizier dipilih oleh Firaun untuk menjadi rujukan dan mendapat nasihat sebelum membuat keputusan, para pengkaji menyebutkan bahawa dalam pelbagai zaman pendeta agama dilantik sebagai Vizier oleh Firaun, selain itu vizier dan pendeta lebih utama untuk berada dalam barisan pentadbiran jika dibandingkan dengan kelompok bangsawan.

Melihat pada kelas-kelas pada piramid sosial tersebut menunjukkan bahawa peranan agama dalam administratif monarki di Mesir sangat tinggi pengaruhnya dan di sinilah timbul persoalan, apakah peranan terpenting agama dalam pemerintahan firaun?

Apabila kita melihat kelompok terakhir dalam piramid sosial tersebut iaitu para hamba dan petani/buruh (slaves and farmers) yang merupakan peratus tertinggi dalam populasi masyarakat Mesir Purba, seakan-akan sebahagian daripada jawapan telah diperoleh untuk menjawab soalan di atas. Apakah rasionalnya sebuah agama jika penindasan dan kezaliman dihalalkan? Di manakah relevansi agama tatkala suara rakyat dihalang sementara kemuncak firaunism pula ialah deklarasi wajibnya kepatuhan dan ketuhanan tanpa soal, tiadanya konsep semak imbang?

Agama yang dicandukan

Pengamalan agama secara tidak jujur dan berkepentingan sebegitu telah berleluasa dalam sejarah Barat dan Muslim, justeru tidak hairanlah Karl Marx (1818-1883) mengkritik peranan agama dengan menyatakan:

“Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo.”

Kritikan tersebut sewajarnya diterima secara kritikal oleh kita, bahawasanya telah berlaku dan sedang berlaku tindakan pembodohan atas nama agama. Tatkala rakyat menderita dengan inflasi yang diakibatkan salah guna kuasa, maka ketika itulah agamawan kerajaan berperanan menyeru kepada kepentingan syukur! Apabila penindasan dan pengamalan dictator semakin berleluasa, tika itu televisyen menyiarkan forum agama tentang haramnya demonstrasi aman.

Pembodohan atas nama agama merupakan rukun utama firaunism, sebagaimana ternukil dalam al-Quran (al-Zukhruf : 54):

“Maka firaun mempengaruhi kaumnya, lalu mereka patuh kepadanya, sesungguhnya mereka (kaumnya) itu dari kalangan orang-orang fasiq”

Firaun memperolok dan memperendah akal kaumnya, lantas kaum yang tidak berfikir itu menuruti dan menyahut segala arahan, tanpa soal dan tanpa bantahan. Kebodohan rakyat dan sikap “redha” merupakan syarat asas dalam mengekalkan Firaun di tampuk kuasa, sementelah Firaun telah mendapat bantuan pendeta agama dan memutar belit falsafah agama. Malahan dalam strategi politik kolonial, sememangnya sesuatu bangsa itu akan dibiarkan terus dalam kitaran kebodohan dan pasif dalam isu-isu politik dan kebangsaan.

Lebih mendukacitakan apabila sentimen agama dan perkauman telah dimanipulasi demi mengekalkan kekuasaan, isu-isu agama diputar 180 darjah demi menutup segala amalan penyelewengan, rasuah dan ketidakadilan dalam pemerintahan. Institusi-institusi fatwa yang terang-terangan tidak bebas daripada pengaruh pemerintah pula akan mengeluarkan fatwa-fatwa dalam pelbagai isu kecil dan sudah diketahui hukumnya oleh majority umat Islam, sambil mendiamkan diri daripada laporan audit yang menyentuh soal penyelewengan wang dan “ghaibnya” harta rakyat. Kepentingan mengekalkan pemerintah korup yang satu bangsa dan satu agama dengan rakyat majoriti telah didoktrin kononnya demi menegakkan keIslaman dan kebangsaan, lantas sentiment keagamaan itu telah menghanyutkan sampah sarap kezaliman dan kediktatoran.

Pengalaman Ghannouchi dan Gerakan Islah

Satu ketika dahulu, Ghannouchi (1941-sekarang )merumuskan bahawa salah satu halangan untuk menentang rejim zalim di Tunisia (sekitar 1970-an) ialah at-tadayyun at-taqlidi at-tunisi (the traditional Tunisian religiosity)yang mengandungi tiga unsur iaitu mazhab fiqh Imam Malik, doktrin akidah al-Ash ‘ariyah dan Sufism. Dalam buku biografi pemikiran Ghannouchi, Azzam Tamimi menulis sebagaimana berikut:

“He sees the exclusive adoption of the Maliki school of fiqh (jurisprudence) as a sign of rigidity and intolerance, and consequently a restriction of ijtihad. The adoption of the al-Ash’ariyah doctrine of theology, in his analysis, compounded the crisis, because the doctrine tends toward al-jabariyah (fatalism).”

Menurut beliau juga, Sufism di Tunisia juga telah mengajarkan budaya penyerahan tanpa soal kepada guru (konsep murid dan shaykh dalam sesetengah tarekat), Ghannouchi berpendirian untuk menentang fatalism dan fahaman taqlid dalam bermazhab. Beliau berpandangan, fatalism mesti diganti dengan free will (menurut doktrin taqdir Ibn Taymiah) dan Ghannouchi sendiri merupakan penulis dan pengkaji pertama dalam dunia kontemporari Tunisia yang menghasilkan tulisan tentang Ibn Taymiah menerusi buku beliau bertajuk al-Qadar ‘inda Ibn Taymiah (Destiny in the thought of Ibn Taymiah/ al-Qadar menurut pandangan Ibn Taymiah). Selain itu menurut beliau perubahan hanya akan dicapai sekiranya taqlid diganti dengan budaya ijtihad dan ketaatan buta terhadap guru tarekat diganti dengan sikap yang diasaskan pada kesamaan, kebebasan memilih dan menghilangkan sakral dan kesucian tokoh-tokoh sufi.

Syahdan, apa yang dilalui oleh Ghannouchi merupakan resam setiap agenda islah, bahkan itu juga yang pernah dilalui oleh Shaykh Muhammad Abduh dan diteruskan oleh murid-muridnya di banyak ceruk dunia dan tidak berkecuali di Tanah Melayu.

Selain Syed Syeikh al-Hadi dan Syeikh Tahir Jalaludin, Zaaba (1895-1973) juga merupakan tokoh yang penting dalam berhadapan dengan konservatif agama. Bukunya, “Perangai Bergantung Kepada Diri Sendiri” sarat dengan pelbagai mesej mengkritik budaya taqlid buta, “redha” dengan pembodohan dan menyeru kepada budaya berfikir yang baru dalam beragama terutama dalam kalangan bangsa Melayu. Pemikiran dan tulisan Zaaba telah ditentang oleh para konservatif agama di Perak pada satu masa dahulu, lalu tulisan-tulisan beliau dilarang daripada disebarkan, namun akhirnya Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (DBP) mengambil tanggungjawab menyebarkan khazanah bernilai tersebut kepada masyarakat.

Antara kata-kata Zaaba dalam buku tersebut ialah: “Tuhan selalu mencela keras akan orang-orang yang hanya mengikut dengan buta tuli sahaja apa yang dikatakan orang atau apa yang biasa dibuat orang. Umpama mereka yang berdegil mengikut jalan nenek moyang atau pendapat orang dahulu-dahulu dengan tiada ditimbang lagi salah benarnya atas neraca timbangan akal sendiri, bahkan tiada dikira walaupun berlawanan dengan akal fikiran yang insaf dan bersalahan dengan ilmu pengetahuan yang sah betulnya.” (m.s 24)

Secara umumnya, kita dapat melihat dalam merawat krisis umat, Abduh, al-Banna, Ghannouchi, Syed Syeikh al-Hadi, Zaaba dan lain-lain telah menawarkan pendidikan dan pencerahan akal dalam mengeluarkan umat daripada kelemahan menuju kekuatan.

How Islamic are Islamic Countries?

Tragedi pembodohan atas nama agama tidak berhenti setakat itu sahaja, malahan dalam berpolitik dan bernegara, masih banyak terdapat “self-declared Islamic State” yang berdiri tegak dengan memutar belit hujah-hujah agama. Wacana kebebasan dimulakan dengan “kebebasan dalam Islam ada hadnya”, lantas diceritakan had-hadnya hingga ditinggalkan makna kebebasan daripada disebar dan diamal. Wacana hak asasi manusia dan demokrasi ditolak kerana katanya ia berasal dari Barat, lantas dipraktikkan apa yang diakui mereka sebagai nilai-nilai Islam sambil menolak pandangan-pandangan sarjana lain. Dalam hal ini, rasionalnya persoalan yang dikemukakan oleh Scheherazade S. Rehman dan Hossein Askari dalam sebuah makalah yang disertai statistic, “How Islamic are Islamic Countries?”

Kajian yang menjadikan isu-isu ekonomi, keadilan, akauntabiliti, tata-kelola yang baik (good governance), isu pendidikan dan nilai-nilai utama yang lain (Sebelum mengemukakan hasil kajian, Rehman dan Askari telah menguraikan dengan agak terperinci mengenai nilai-nilai yang diambil kira, sila rujuk lanjut kajian tersebut) telah menobatkan anggota OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) di tangga yang terkebelakang dan corot berbanding negara-negara bukan Islam yang lain. New Zealand, Luxembourg, Ireland, Iceland telah mendahului senarai Overall Islamicity Index Rank, sementara jaguh negara agama seperti Arab Saudi dan Iran masing-masing menduduki tangga ke-131 dan 163.

Sekali lagi diulang pertanyaan, sejauh manakah Islamnya Negara Islam? Asas-asas dan nilai yang disediakan Islam dalam konsep kenegaraan sangat jelas, bahkan menurut Rehman dan Askari, lebih teliti berbanding doktrin dalam agama Kristian. Namun mengapakah negara-negara yang mengistiharkan pemisahan antara negara dan gereja (agama) mendahului kategori negara yang mempraktikkan nilai-nilai Islam jika dibandingkan dengan self-declared Islamic Countries?

Dalam menjawab persoalan tersebut, saya merujuk kembali kepada perbincangan kita di atas iaitu bahawa budaya firaunism seperti memanipulasi peranan agama, pengsakralan pemerintah, menghalang hak asasi rakyat, pembodohan terhadap rakyat (menyekat maklumat-maklumat menerusi kawalan terhadap media) dan seumpamanya telah mendominasi sesetengah negara umat Islam. Maka menjadi tanggungjawab umat yang sedar untuk merubah dan merawati masyarakat, selain menentang segala macam unsur-unsur firaunism, atas apa nama sekalipun sama ada akta mahupun rang undang-undang. Menentang firaunism ialah tanggungjawab utama manusia, selain merupakan bukti keluruhan keimanan manusia beragama. Bagaimana bisa diakui hidup berTuhan sekiranya dalam masa yang sama membiarkan peraturan dan manusia angkuh berlagak Tuhan?

Demokrasi dan kebebasan bersuara

Terbaru di tanah air kita, Rang Undang-undang Perhimpunan Aman telah diluluskan oleh parlimen (khasnya menerusi pihak Kerajaan sementara ahli parlimen Pakatan Rakyat telah sebulat suara membantah). Hal yang sungguh mendukacitakan ini berlaku setelah beberapa tragedi tragis menimpa demokrasi di tanah air seperti tindakan polis terhadap demonstran Bersih (Julai 2011) dan hak kebebasan akademik yang dicabul.

Kebebasan bersuara dan berhimpun merupakan salah satu rukun terpenting demokrasi. Tindakan menyekatnya atas apa jua nama mengingatkan kita dengan peristiwa Firaun yang menyatakan kepada kaumnya (al-Ghafir : 29) :

“Wahai kaumku! Kamulah yang memiliki kerajaan (Mesir) pada hari ini, kamulah yang terkemuka di dunia ini, tetapi siapakah yang dapat menolong kita dari azab Allah jika azab itu menimpa kita? Jawab Firaun: Aku tidak kemukakan fikiranku melainkan apa yang aku pandang baik dan aku tidak tunjukkan kepada kamu melainkan jalan yang benar.”

Salah seorang yang beriman dengan ajaran Musa as telah menasihati Firaun menerusi ruang yang ada, namun dijawab penuh kesombongan oleh Firaun, “Aku tidak kemukakan fikiranku melainkan apa yang aku pandang baik dan aku tidak tunjukkan kepada kamu melainkan jalan yang benar.” Jawapan itu telah menutup pintu semak imbang, akauntabiliti dan bantahan daripada masyarakat. Jawapan itu jugalah yang akan menyebabkan kediktatoran berkekalan atas nama pemerintah sentiasa betul!

Pengamalan menyekat kebebasan bersuara dan berhimpun petanda kepada malapetaka yang besar menimpa seluruh manusia dan tidak menghormati karamah insaniah (human dignity) kerana dalam dunia hari ini, hak untuk bersuara merupakan antara hak paling asas yang dimiliki insan. Prof Tariq Ramadhan dalam bukunya The Quest For Meaning menyatakan:

"At the human and physiological level, the first freedom is the freedom we acquire once we have satisfied our elementary natural needs.” (pg. 55)

Kenyataan daripada Prof Tariq itu lebih menekankan bahawa apalah gunanya kehidupan sebagai seorang manusia sekiranya hak-hak asas seperti makanan, pakaian dan tempat tinggal (keperluan terdesak/dharuri) masih tak terjamin, dan dalam konteks hari ini ketempangan pemerintahan dan salah guna kuasa antara yang menyumbang ke arah terbatasnya hak-hak asas tersebut. Dari sudut yang lain, “elementary natural needs” selaku seorang warganegara pula mengajak kita merenung betapa status kita selaku warganegara (manusia) mesti diragui lantaran hak asasi kita iaitu kebebasan bersuara dan berhimpun telah dinafikan secara tidak rasional.

Khatimah

Seorang ulama Turki, Musa Topbas telah menukilkan kata-kata penuh inspirasi daripada Rumi dalam bukunya, The Secret in The Love for God (edisi asal bertajuk Muhabbetteki Sir, diterjemah daripada bahasa Turki):

"O traveller of truth! Do you want to know the truth? Neither Moses nor the Pharoah are dead. They are alive in you. They keep fighting each other in you! So look for them in yourself!"

Puisi ini boleh dinilai dan dihayati dari pelbagai sudut, namun temanya tetap sama iaitu menonjolkan pertarungan dan pergelutan antara haq dan bathil, adil dan zalim, dosa dan pahala dan sebagainya. Ya benar, Firaun dan Musa itu sedang mendiami diri kita, pertarungan itu berterusan dan sentiasa berlaku. Pergelutan antara Musa dan Firaun juga telah melatari sistem politik kita. Oleh itu di mana ada firaunism maka di pada ketika itu kita semua adalah Musa!

Islah adalah jalan keluarnya, sementara pembodohan adalah halangan terbesar.

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Interview with al-'Alwani: “There is no justice with dictatorship”

*Wawancara ini diambil daripada Majalah Muslim Democrat, Volume 4, No. 1, January 2002. Diterbitkan oleh, Center for the Study of Islam & Democracy (CSID).


Shaykh Taha Jabir al-'Alwani, President of Graduate School of Islamic and Social Science (GSISS) and Center for the Study of Islam & Democracy (CSID) Director

Q. Can you please introduce yourself to the readers of Muslim Democrat?

A. My name is Taha Jabir Alalwani. I was born and grew up in Iraq. After I graduated from al-Azhar University in Cairo in 1959, I went back to Iraq and worked as a professor of Islamic Studies in the military academy and Imam in one of the famous mosques in Baghdad. When the Baath party took over, I decided to go back to Cairo to get my Master’s and doctorate degrees. I graduated from al-Azhar in 1972 with a Ph.D. on “Fakhruddine al-Razi and his contributions to usul al-Fiqh”. I then taught Islamic Jurisprudence in Saudi Arabia for eleven years. In Saudi Arabia, I met with the late Dr. Ismail al-Faruqi, Dr. Abdulhameed abu-Sulayman, and their colleagues, and we decided to establish the “International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)”. We came to America and established the Institute in 1984. I am now teaching at the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS) in Leesburg, Virginia. I am also the President of GSISS and the chairman of the Fiqh (Jurisprudence) Council of North America.

Q. In your opinion, what are the main challenges facing the Muslim Ummah today, in the 21st century?

A. Muslims need to know themselves and know the others. They don’t know who they are, what their role in life is, and what kind of relations they should have with others. They tend to choose naive and simplistic answers. They like to summarize everything by saying it is haram (forbidden) or halal (allowed). But Fiqh (jurisprudence) is not everything. It is only one aspect of life. Life is not based on law alone. You have legal, economic, social, and political needs. The majority of Muslims, in the west and abroad, think it is enough to say this is halal or this is haram, this is OK, this is not, this is ‘kufr’. What about the gray areas, and what about our role in life?

Some of us think life is only a path to death, and that all you need to do is take shortcuts to al-Janna (paradise). Is this the only purpose in life. What about life itself? Allah tells us we are His vicegerents on earth and gave us his trust (amana). He gave us certain responsibilities. In the Qur’an, Allah says “He who created you from this earth and gave you the responsibility to build it”. Our task is to build a civilization with values. Unfortunately, this concept is absent from our lives.

Muslims now have an “individual” mentality. They think of the need of the individual not the Ummah, or community, needs. In our religion, we have many obligations called “furudh al-kifayah”, i.e. the obligations of the Ummah/community. You must have hospitals, doctors, engineers, schools, roads, food, etc. These obligations fall on the community. The individual must cooperate with others to fulfill these requirements. Muslims think, by mistake, that if you pay to build a Mosque, you will get more reward from Allah than if you pay to build a hospital, for example. A Muslim can feel the link between the Mosque and Allah, but he or she can’t feel or see the link between a hospital and Allah, in the same way. This also applies to other societal needs such as housing students, publishing books, or building an institution fighting against dictatorship and calling for Shura and democracy.

This is a misguided and distorted understanding of Islam. We need to rebuild our concept of life and help Muslims understand their role in life and how to have a balance between life and the hereafter. How to build a strong Ummah or community? This is the big challenge and the responsibility of the elite of this Ummah. Anyone who has some education must do his or her best to help the Ummah understand these needs.

Q. What about the concept of an Islamic state. Is there such a thing as an “Islamic State” and how would you define it?

A. I would like to be very frank on this issue. In all of my studies, I never felt that Islam was too concerned about building a state. Islam, from the beginning, was working to build an Ummah and there is a big difference between building an Ummah and building a state. Building an Ummah means you have certain concepts and values. The Muslim Ummah is based on three main values: tawheed (oneness of God), Tazkiy’ah (purification of the human being), and Imr’an (building a civilization with values). These three values are considered as the main goals of Islam (maqasid al-sharia). When you build an Ummah, on Tawheed, Tazkiy’ah, and Imr’an, you will have a strong Ummah. Ummah means a community built around certain values. For example, the founders of this country left Europe and came here with certain values. They did not find room to implement those values in Europe, so they decided to find another place. They came here with their values to build this country. This is an Ummah, and not a nation, because nation is built around a piece of land, and not values.

This means that God does not want to be governor or mayor. God created us, and gave us certain values. He told us if you like to fulfill your duty on this earth, you must follow these principles. The details of how to build your political or your economic system are up to you. God has not appointed a Khalif (leader) for us. It is up to us, the Ummah, to appoint a Khalif, but this Khalif cannot be responsible for everything. He must be guided by the Ummah, through a parliament or Majlis As-Shura, and he must be accountable to the Ummah. This understanding of the sovereignty of God is part of the legacy of the children of Israel, not the Islamic legacy. In the beginning, Allah swt decided to lead this experience by himself. He told them “I am going to build you as a model. Your land is a sacred land, you are my nation and my people, and I will be your governor and leader. Your prophets and messengers will be my assistants”. That’s why when you read the old testament, you find that their relationship with Allah was a relationship between a people and their leader, not their God. For example, they ask him we need lentils, we need onions, we need this and we need that. When they asked for water, Allah said “O, Moses, hit the stone with your cane, and you will get water”. He did, and every tribe got their own water.

The relationship was based on miracles of the unseen. Then, they got bored from that. When they saw other people worshipping a cow, they said we need a God we can see as those people have their own God. We need to talk to him directly, and the Sameri made a cow for them. They said to Moses, we dislike to deal with somebody we can’t see. God changed from direct divine sovereignty to the King/Khalif. “O David, we have appointed you as vicegerent on earth”.

The direct sovereignty of God is over. Allah swt mentioned those stories in the Qur’an as lessons. Unfortunately, some colleagues from the Islamists misunderstood the stories. They thought that sovereignty of God still applies, and Muhammad peace be upon him, like Moses, came to implement sovereignty of Allah. No, he did not. He did not even talk about it.

Q. What about the verse that says “Whoever does not rule according to Allah’s wishes are the unbelievers”. Many Islamists use this to justify the need for an Islamic state?

A. That verse means rule according to Allah’s teachings as Ummah. This means you have sources, which are the Qur’an and Sunna, and you have to develop the system to implement those values. Your obligation is to implement justice. How? It is your business. I need from you to build freedom, How? It is your business. I need from you to establish fairness and trust, How to do that? It is the business of the community, the Ummah.

The message of Islam is not for a specific nation. It is impossible to develop a political system for the whole world and put all of humanity under one system, regardless of differences in languages, cultures, backgrounds, ethnicity, etc. The message of Islam is a message for all humanity. If we try to put all human beings under one Sultanic system or kingdom, or dictatorship, or whatever, no one will accept Islam. But, Allah says I have these values I want you to implement. You should
develop a system, according to your own needs, to implement these values.

Q. When we attempt to develop a system according to our needs, there will invariably
be different interpretations. How do we resolve these differences?

A. Islam teaches us that we need to agree on certain values, but the system is up to us. The system is something under our Ijtihad and our understanding. When you neglect the Ummah, the whole nation, and take your decision by yourself, what does that mean? That means you think you don’t need the Ummah and the people. You are highest and you are above them. The Qur’an says “Man becomes an oppressor because he thinks he is highest”.

That means when the governor or ruler starts to think that his people are inferior to him and that he does not need them, they should stop him and get him away from power. Why? Because he will cross all the lines and become a dictator. You don’t need to wait for him until he says like Pharaoh did, “I don’t know any other God for you except me”. From the beginning, we should put the ruler under certain laws and restrictions to help him see the picture in a proper way. If he says “I am responsible before Allah”, we should tell him “no, you are responsible before the people.”

If we use these three values to build our system, we will never allow a dictator to come to power riding a tank or forcing the people to accept him as a leader. I remember, on August 2, 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait I was in Egypt. Many people around me were very happy to see Saddam invade Kuwait. I told them “he will never succeed because the Qur’an teaches us that “The oppressors will not reach
my covenant” and that “Allah does not guide those who are oppressors”. When you practice this kind of dictatorship and oppression, you will never be able to succeed in the long run.”

Q. One of problems that some Muslims have with democracy is the rule of the majority. They say we don’t have to follow the majority
because the majority can be wrong. Therefore the rule of the majority is not required. What do you think about this?

A. This is wrong. Sometimes, Muslims look at one part and forget the other parts. I call this the “Jurisprudence (Fiqh) mentality”, because as a Faqih I always look at the small details of the case and forget about the others. But when you look at the whole picture you will find something else. Allah told us to implement justice, truth, trust, purification, civilization, etc. This responsibility falls on the Ummah, which means the majority and not the minority. If there is any protection from Allah, it is for the majority not the minority. Prophet Muhammad said, “My Ummah will never agree on wrongdoing”. There is about 18 hadiths like this, about the guidance and protection from Allah to the Ummah. The Ummah always reaches the truth, but the minority sometimes reaches the truth and sometimes misses it. The Prophet says “You should follow the majority (Sawad al-atham) of the Ummah”. That’s why the concept of Ijmaa (unanimity) should be revived to move away from individual and minority rule?

Q. But if we don’t have a unanimity (Ijmaa), is it OK to accept the majority?

A. It is better to accept the majority than to accept a minority. If I follow the majority, I am always on the safe side. Following the minority will open the door to other minorities to take over by claiming to know the truth. We can’t open this door because it will lead to unspeakable violence and confrontations.

Q. A major hurdle facing the Muslim world today is dictatorship or lack of freedom, because it does not allow people to discuss different ideas, strategies, and approaches and to evaluate solutions. Are you optimistic about the ability of Muslims to overcome this hurdle? And how do we get out of this situation?

A. When we look at history, we find that dictatorship in Europe’s history was much stronger and harsher than dictatorship in our countries. However, with time, Europeans developed an acute awareness about this problem. Unfortunately, in our heritage we have some ‘viruses’, and the dictators always use them.

When I was a student in Egypt, Jamal Abdel-Nasser invited some of the writers and journalists. He told them: “some of you were talking before the revolution about justice coming through a dictator (a just dictator), I see some of you now objecting to my role, Why? I am a dictator but I am also just!” This concept was, unfortunately, even mentioned by al-Afghani himself who used this term (al-mustabid al-Aadel). He said that the Muslim Ummah needs a “just dictator”. Allah, swt, told us there is no way to put these two together. There is no justice with dictatorship. You cannot have both. This kind of thinking needs to be changed in the minds of Muslims.

Q. Finally, do you have any advice for CSID? What do you think we should be doing and should be emphasizing?

A. I am always thinking about CSID, and about how to bring freedom to the Muslim countries, but I feel you have a very difficult task ahead. America and the West can help in many ways, but it is difficult, because our culture and our mentality are based on Islam. If you don’t bring new ideas through Islam itself, those ideas will be resented and rejected. In Saudi Arabia, for example, America from time to time raises its voice about the need to implement democratic reforms. Saudi officials reply that our religion talks about Shura, and we have a Majlis for Shura and we don’t need anything else because this is our culture and mentality. Even religious leaders and scholars can’t accept democracy because they see it as foreign to Islam. We, therefore, need to try to find something from our legacy and from our heritage, and ask them to implement it. Yes, certain groups may raise some objections, but they are much more likely to accept the proposed reforms, if we can show them that they are from our own religion and heritage, and not in contradiction with it.

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Is Today's Europe a Land of Islam?

By Dr Jasser Auda

Abstract

This article is a re-examination of the concept of ‘land of Islam’ in the fiqh (understanding) of the classic schools of the Islamic jurisprudence. The objective is to understand the criteria that jurists use for defining a certain land to be a ‘Land of Islam’. The study reveals that neither Muslims being a majority, nor the application of the corporal part of the Islamic criminal law (hudud), is a valid criterion. The study also reveals that the fundamental criteria used in the Islamic jurisprudence have to do with security (al-amn), freedom to practice the Islamic acts of worship (sh`a'ir al-islam), and justice (al-`adl). Thus, although a comprehensive and realistic survey/index is required, a rough assessment of how European countries in general fare on the surveyed criteria gives them a relatively high score on the ‘Land of Islam’ scale.

Introduction

One of the main concepts that shape Muslim minorities’ worldview is the concept of ‘Muslim countries’, or in other expressions, the ‘Islamic World’, or the ‘Land of Islam’. This concept has a strong impact on the ‘contextualisation’ of Muslims in the west in general and Europe in particular.

First, because some Muslims perceive that they live in a ‘non-Muslim’ or ‘disbelieving’ land, they give themselves a special status of an exceptional case, in which they think that the principles of justice and honesty do not apply to their dealings in these countries. Some other Muslims, including some who are European to the roots and to the core, always yearn to live in the ‘Land of Islam’. A few of them venture to immigrate or relocate to that land, only to face an unexpected and sometimes shocking reality. Moreover, and quite unfortunately, a few but loud groups of Muslims take the view that because they do not live in the ‘Land of Islam’, therefore they live in the ‘Land of War’. Bad politics and clash-of-civilizations advocates, also quite unfortunately, give these groups additional justifications to commit crimes –in the name of Islam– against the land they live in and their fellow citizens, and thus, add fuel to an already vicious cycle. Last but not least, a feeling that a European Muslim does not live in his or her ‘natural’ and ‘default’ Land of Islam goes against their other feelings of belonging and identification. This conflict has serious implications on a number of issues, from politics and education to community participation and citizenship.

This article is examining the concept of ‘land of Islam’ in various Islamic classic schools of law. The objective is to understand whether this concept is an absolute concept that is defined via certain geographical borders, or it is, rather, a concept that is relative to certain values and conditions. Thus, this article is asking two questions:

What are the criteria for judging a certain geographical area to be a ‘Land of Islam’, in the Classic Islamic Jurisprudence sense? In this regard, reference is made to popular classic sources, in addition to modern interpretations of them.
Based on these criteria, how can we assess a certain geographical/political area as being close to the ideal ‘Land of Islam’?

Shari`ah versus Fiqh

Before discussing definitions of ‘dar al-Islam’ (land of Islam), one must note that this whole discussion does not fall in the area of shari`ah (the constant Islamic divine way). It falls rather in the area of fiqh (which is the human understanding of this divine way).

The word fiqh is used in the Qur’an and hadith in various forms to refer to the process of understanding, comprehension, and gaining knowledge of the religion in general. Eventually, and since the end of the era of the imams of the Islamic schools of law/thought around the third Islamic century, the word fiqh has been typically defined as, ‘knowledge of practical revealed rulings extracted from detailed evidences’.[1] ‘Detailed evidences’ are verses from the Qur’an and narrations of prophetic hadith.

On the other hand, the term ‘shari`ah law’ has negative connotations in the English language, because it is normally used to refer to various corporal punishments used in some countries. Statistically speaking, these punishments have been applied predominantly on the weak and marginalised in these societies. This partial application raises serious questions about the political motives behind applying these punishments, regardless of the juridical/theological debates over them.

Nevertheless, the word shari`ah is used in the Qur’an to mean a ‘revealed way of life,’ for example, the word ‘shir`ah’ in Surat al-Ma’idah, {To each of you We prescribed a law and a way} (5:48), and the word shari`ah in Surat al-Jathiyah, {Then We put you, [O Muhammad], on an ordained way concerning the matter [of religion]; so follow it and do not follow the inclinations of those who do not know} (45:18). Yusuf Ali translated them as ‘Law’ and ‘Way,’ respectively. Picktall translated them as ‘divine law’ and ‘road.’ Irving translated them as ‘code of law’ and ‘highroad.’ My translation of the word shari`ah to mean ‘a way of life’ is similar to Ramadan’s.[2]

However, in the First Encyclopaedia of Islam, Schacht defines shari`ah as a ‘canon law’ that is sometimes ‘synonymous’ with fiqh. He wrote:

SHARI`A (A) also SHAR` (originally infinitive), the road to the watering place, the clear path to be followed, the path which the believer has to tread, the religion of Islam, as a technical term, the canon law of Islam, the totality of Allah’s commandments … Fikh (along with the sciences of tafsir and hadith and the ancillary sciences) is the science of the shari`a or the shari`ah (c.f. FIKH) and sometimes be used as synonymous with it, and the `usul al-fikh are also called usul al-shar`.[3]

Nevertheless, it is important to differentiate fiqh from shari`ah. First, the two terms refer to two different meanings; fiqh represents the ‘human’ part of the Islamic law, while shari`ah, by definition, represents the ‘heavenly’ part of this law, for the believers. Thus, the term faqih is used for people with ‘understanding’ (fahm),[4] ‘perception’,[5] and ‘cognition’ (idrak),[6] and is not to be used for God.[7] This is because, for the believers, fiqh is an attribute of deficiency, rather than an attribute of perfection. On the other hand, the term Al- shari` (‘The Legislator’) refers to God himself,[8] and could not be used for humans, except for the Prophet, when he ‘conveys a message from God’.[9]

This differentiation entails the following two consequences, which have a direct impact on the concepts of ‘land of Islam’ and ‘land of war’:

Fiqh could not claim to be ‘infallible’ or ‘perfect’, and a faqih could possibly be right or wrong on any opinion. Scholars (Fuqaha) correct each other via juridical debating (munazarah). Shari`ah, for the believers, cannot be wrong, because the Qur’an and the prophetic sayings, when the Prophet conveys a message from God, are truths in their own right.

Fiqh is changeable, and in fact must change with the change of place and time (except for the ritual acts of worship). Shari`ah, for the believers, does not change with the change of space and time.

Thus, blurring the line between fiqh and shari`ah does not allow the changeable parts of the law to ‘evolve’ with the change of time and place. Moreover, it gives way to claims of ‘divinity’ and ‘sanctity’ in human juridical ijtihad/opinions. Historically, these claims have resulted in two serious phenomena, namely, mutual accusations of heresy and resistance of renewal in the Islamic law.[10]

The above analysis applies directly to the fiqhi concepts/constructs of ‘dar al-Islam’ and ‘dar al- harb’, both of which are mentioned nowhere in the Islamic scripts of Qur'an and hadith, to start with. In other words, the concept of a ‘dar’ is not ‘revealed shari`ah’, contrary to some current opinions.[11] It is merely a fiqhi interpretation of the shari`ah that had its historical context. It could be valid, but is not ‘infallible’ and is indeed ‘changeable’.

Classic Definitions of Dar al-Islam

For the sake of this article, a survey was carried out on the concept of the ‘Land of Islam’ (dar al-islam) in the main classic sources of the Islamic law known today, which includes various Sunni, Shi`a, and Ibadi Schools of Law, and related contemporary studies. The results of the survey reveal some interesting facts and popular misconceptions. First, the two current popular criteria that define whether or not a country is ‘Islamic’ or part of the ‘Land of Islam’ are not supported by any school of the Islamic law.

1. The first criteria is having some sort of a 50% +1 majority of Muslims, regardless of whether the constitution states that it is a ‘secular country’, such as in Turkey, where the constitution does not define any specific religion for that country, such as in Nigeria or Indonesia, where the head of state is non-Muslim, such as in Lebanon, or where the Islamic rituals and acts of worship are not generally practiced, such as in a number of former Soviet Union States. In fact, a number of classic judicial sources from various schools clearly state that the issue of Muslims being a majority or a minority in a certain country is irrelevant to a land being a ‘Land of Islam’.[12]

2. The other popular criteria, which was recently applied to a rural region of tribal Pakistan in an attempt to get it out of the ‘Land of War’ zone, is the application of the Islamic criminal law (especially the corporal part known as hudud). However, we also did not find any explicit mention in any classic school of Islamic law that relates the ‘Islamicity’ of a land or a state specifically to the application of hudud.

To answer the question ‘what are the classic criteria for a Land of Islam’, the results of the survey carried out for the sake of this study could be summarised in the following five criteria.

1. A land where Islamic rules (ahkam al-islam) apply.[13]
2. A land where a Muslim ruler has control (isteela’) over its affairs.[14]
3. A land of security (al-amn).[15]
4. A land where the practicing of public acts of worship (sha’ir al-islam) is allowed.[16]
5. A ‘Land of Justice’ (dar al-`adl).[17]

The following is a brief analysis of each of these concepts and their implications.

The ‘Land of Islamic Rulings’

A popular definition of the Land of Islam in classic sources is, ‘the land where the Islamic rulings are applied’.[18] The question is: What are these ‘Islamic rulings’? There is a popular (mis-)conception that the application of the Islamic rulings in a society is synonymous with the codification of the Islamic law in its legal system. However, the very concept of law, in the qanun (legal system) sense, was not known in Muslim-majority countries until late nineteenth century.[19] It is indeed a concept that has a ‘post-colonial’ context, the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that the ‘application of the Shari`ah in the legal system’, or Shari`ah -compliant laws’, were definitely not part of the ‘Land of Islam’ classic interpretation.

I had an interesting conversation with a Muslim convert from London, U.K.,[20] which is quite relevant to this research. He insisted that every law in the Europe is ‘non-Islamic’, and when I asked him to explain why, he said: Because the legislators are not Muslims. I asked: The laws that criminalise theft, killing, monopoly, bribery, abuse, and so on, aren’t these ‘Islamic laws’. He said: No, because the people proposed them are not Muslim. I replied: But that is irrelevant, isn’t it? He replied: No, because they did not have the right ‘intention’ (niyyah) when they proposed them. I asked: What do you think their intent was? He said: The intent behind these laws is the achievement of justice. I exclaimed: Isn’t justice an ‘Islamic’ intent for the law? He replied: No, because they applied justice because it best served the material well-being of the people, not because it is ordained by God. I replied: But the well-being of the people is exactly the purpose of God’s order to establish justice, isn’t it? He disagreed.

The conversation outlined above show the general (mis-)perception of the ‘non-Islamic’ versus ‘Islamic’ dichotomy in the ‘application of the Islamic rulings’ in a society. In the classic texts, however, the ‘Islamic ruling’ (ah kam al-islam) were explained in several other senses, which the rest of this article will attempt to investigate.

The ‘Land of a Muslim Ruler’

To have a Muslim ruler in ‘control’ (isteela’) over the affairs of a certain land is a criterion that some classic and contemporary scholars used for judging that a certain land is indeed a ‘Land of Islam’.[21] Al-Mawardi, for example, explicitly mentions that ‘when Muslims reside in and control a certain land, it becomes a Land of Islam’.[22]

However, this criterion is subject to a number of conditions to be valid, prime of which is the ability of Muslims to practice their religious obligations, a public feeling of security, and the application of justice. A Muslim ruler who fails to observe or work towards these obligations jeopardises the status of ‘Land of Islam’ of his jurisdiction. Sheikh Rashid Reda summarizes these conditions as follows:

Indeed, many countries that are governed by Muslim leaders are countries where one is forced against practicing his/her religion and cannot reveal everything he/she believes in or fulfils his/her practical Islamic obligations, especially enjoining good, forbidden evil, and the ability to criticise rulings that go against the Divine Law. This land, according to some scholars, is a ‘Land of War’.

Thus, the existence of enough security and freedom to allow Muslims to practice religion is, juridically speaking, more essential than the religion of the ruler.

The ‘Land of Security’

In fact, a number of Imams stated that security is the purpose (maqs ud) of the Land of Islam versus Land of War classification, to start with, and not ‘Islam’ versus ‘non-Islam’ per se.

For example, Imam Abu Hanifa states:

The purpose (maqsud) of calling a certain land a ‘Land of Islam’ or a ‘land of disbelief (kufr)’ is not Islam versus kufr. It is security versus insecurity.[23]

Makkah itself – according to Imam al-Bayhaqi for example – became a ‘Land of Islam’ after its ‘conquest’ only because of its newly found sense of security. He writes:

Makkah became a ‘Land of Islam’ and ‘land of security’ after its conquest because no one there was forced against his/her religion. Any other land is likewise if it acquires the same kind of security.[24]

It is clear from the classic definitions too that security itself is means to the end of freedom to practice the Islamic ‘public acts of worship’ (Arabic: sha`a’ir al-islam). Several scholars mentioned that a Muslims who have enough security and freedom to practice sha`a’ir al-islam actually live in a ‘Land of Islam’, even if they were minority. Al-Qummi Al-Naisaburi explains:

Muslims, even a minority, are prevailing over non-Muslims, even if they were a majority, if they are not prevented from practicing the public Islamic acts of worship (sha`a’ir al-islam).[25]

The next section elaborates on these Islamic public acts of worship, which appear to form a rather basic criterion for judging a land to be a ‘Land of Islam’.

The ‘Land of Freedom to practice Islam’

The majority of scholars and schools of Islamic law find this criterion to be the ‘true sign that a certain land is a Land of Islam’.[26] Many of them refer to certain prophetic traditions during the times of war and interpret them to mean that certain acts, such as group prayers in the mosque, the call for prayer (adhan), pilgrimage, the celebration of `Eid, and so on, identify the ‘land of Islam’. Al-Mawardi, for example, writes:

The public acts of worship (sha`a’ir) of Islam such as group prayers in mosques and call for prayers are the criteria by which the Prophet, peace be upon him, differentiated between the Land of Islam and the Land of Disbelief. [27]

Perhaps it is useful here to reiterate that Al-Mawardi’s ‘land of Islam’ and ‘land of disbelief’ expressions are not expressions that appeared in the text of the narrations. They are his own ‘fiqh’ or understanding of them. This understanding, however, is shared by a large number of jurists. Al-Razi, for example, writes:

If the Islamic acts of worship are evident in streets and public places, this certainly entails that Islam is dominant.[28]

Ibn Taymiyah writes:

The public acts of worship (sha`a’ir) of Islam are the true signs that a certain land is a Land of Islam.[29]

These ‘public acts of worship’ (sha`a’ir) include a variety of Islamic rituals, which include one or more of the following, according to the various schools of law that were included in the survey:

1. The daily five prayers.[30]
2. The Call (adhan) for the prayers.[31]
3. Friday prayers.[32]
4. Fasting in Ramadan.[33]
5. Giving the annual (zakah) charity.[34]
6. Pilgrimage (Hajj).[35]
7. Ablution (Wudu').[36]
8. Festival (`Eid) prayers.[37]
9. Recitation the Qur’an.[38]
10. Circumcision (of boys).[39]
11. Sacrificing animals (to feed the poor).[40]
12. Building mosques, and especially minarets.[41]
13. Greeting people with ‘peace be upon you’.[42]
14. Charitable endowments (awaqaf).[43]

Thus, if Muslims are allowed to practice the above acts of worship in a given land, this land becomes a ‘Land of Freedom to practice Islam’; an expression that is synonymous with the ‘Land of Islam’ according to many sources. But if we objectively assess various countries, provinces, regions, or cities around the world based on Muslims’ freedom to practice the above specific Islamic acts of worship, and create some sort of ‘index’ for them, we will quickly realise that many European countries and regions would easily score a full score, more or less. This imaginary ‘index’ would directly suggest changing or re-interpreting the definition of the ‘land of Islam’ to include these countries and cities in it.

The ‘Land of Justice’ (Dar al-`adl)

This criterion, the achievement of justice, is so central in the Islamic concept of ‘Land of Islam’ to the extent that the ‘land of justice’ term interchangeably with the ‘Land of Islam’ term in numerous sources.[44] Justice is the basis of all of the above criteria, according to many Islamic jurists, and hence more fundamental in the Islamic principles and purposes. Thus, an ‘Islamic leadership’ that is not based on justice and is based on ‘ethnic solidarity’ (`asabiyyah) does not constitute a valid condition for the ‘Land of Islam’. Rashid Reda, for example, explains:

The land of justice, which is the Land of Islam, is a land that has a true leader who establishes justice. This is contrary to the ‘land of injustice and aggression’, in which governorship is based on some ‘ethnic solidarity’ (`asabiyyah), practiced by some Muslims, regardless of the establishment of the Islamic rulings.[45]

Al-Mawardi also stresses the importance of ‘competence’ and a ‘good character’ of the leader in the ‘Land of Justice’. He writes:

People who are qualified to make decisions in the Land of Justice should choose a leader who possesses a good character and competency.[46]

Ibn Taymiyah holds the ‘achievement of justice’ in a state as most fundamental and deserving of God’s support, even for a ‘nation of disbelievers’. He writes:

In this life, people prevail when justice prevails in their society even if they fall into various kinds of sins. However, people will not prevail when injustice and lack of rights prevail in their society. That is why the saying goes: God upholds a state established on justice, even if it were a nation of disbelievers, and would not uphold a state established on injustice, even if it were a nation of Muslims. The other saying goes: This world lives with justice and disbelief, and does not live with injustice and Islam. The Prophet, peace be upon him, had said: ‘No sin has a faster Divine punishment than the sin of injustice …’. Thus, people of injustice fail in this life, even if they were to be forgiven in the hereafter. This is because justice is the universal law of things.[47]

Discussion

Popular juridical investigations tend to think in terms of ‘opposing tendencies’ that, in my view, constitute false dichotomies. Thus, ideas are always expressed in terms of contradictions, such as, abrogating versus abrogated (nasikh/mansukh), exact versus illusionary (mundabit/mawhum), subjective versus objective (shakhsi/mawdu`i), and land of Islam versus land of war (dar al-Islam/dar al-Harb). This way of thinking limited the ability of the Islamic law to take into consideration cases in the ‘grey area’ between these extreme positions and stances. If we imagine a human vision that is confined to a false binary choice between black and white, we will wind up losing an infinite number of grey levels in a picture, let alone missing on its colours.

Similarly, the ‘Land of Islam’ versus the ‘Land of War or Disbelief’, ‘good ruler’ versus ‘evil ruler’, ‘security’ versus ‘insecurity’, ‘freedom in practicing Islam’ versus ‘no freedom in practicing Islam’, and ‘justice’ versus ‘injustice’, are all false dichotomies. There is no land anywhere that has any of the above features in absolute terms. In other words, the achievement of the criteria presented in this article, especially the three most fundamental (security, freedom, and justice) is relative, whether in a Muslim-majority or a Muslim-minority society.

Thus, and perhaps contrary to popular (mis-)perceptions, a country that is juridically worthy of being a ‘Land of Islam’, ‘Land of Security’, or ‘Land of Justice’ is a country that achieves a relatively high score on the criteria that are detailed above. Building an ‘index’ for that score obviously requires a comprehensive and realistic survey of various countries in order to create a measurable ranking of some sort. However, a rough but reasonable assessment of how European countries meet all of the above criteria gives them a relatively high score on the ‘Land of Islam’ scale.

[1] For example: Abu Zahra, Mohammad, Usul Al-Fiqh. Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, Cairo, 1958, p.5.
[2] Ramadan, Tariq, To Be a European Muslim, Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 1999, p.28.
[3] J. Schacht, ‘Shari’ah,’ in: Houtsma, M. Th., T. W. Arnold, R. Basset, and R. Hartmann (eds.), First Encyclopaedia of Islam 1913-1936, Leiden, New York, Copenhagen, Koln: E.J. Brill, 1987, vol. 4, p.320.
[4] Ibn Taymiyah, Ahmad, Kutub Wa Rasa’il Wa Fatwa. Edited by Abdur-Rahman al-Najdi. 2nd ed. Maktabat Ibn Taymiyah, Riyadh, without date, vol.13, p.113.
[5] Al-Subki, Ali, Al-’Ibhaj Fi Sharh Al-Minhaj. Dar al-Nashr, Beirut, 1983, vol.1, p.39.
[6] Al-Haj, Ibn Amir, Al-Taqrir Wal-Tahbir Fi `Ilm Usul Al-Fiqh. Dar al-fikr, Beirut, 1996, vol.1, p.26.
[7] For example, Shaikhi-Zadah, Abdel-Rahman, Majma` Al-Anhur. Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, Beirut,1998, vol.1, p.11.
[8] For example, Ibid.
[9] Ibn Ashur, al-Tahir, Alaysa Al-Subh Bi-Qareeb? Al-Sharikah al-Tunusiyah le-Funun al-Rassm, Tunis, 1988, Ch.6.
[10] A more detailed discussion in: Auda, Jasser, Maqasid al- Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach, International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), London, 2008, Ch.3.
[11] For example: Ismail Fatani, Ikhtilaf Al-Darain, 2nd ed., Dar al-Salam, Cairo, 1998.
[12] For example: Al-Qummi Al-Naisaburi, Nizamuddin (d. 728 h). Tafsir Ghara’ib al-Qur’an, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1996, vol.3, p.459, and Al-Bayhaqi, Ahmad Ibn Al-Hussein (d. 458 h). Sunan al-Bayhaqi al-Kubra, Dar al-Bazz, Mecca,1994, vol.9, p.16.

[13] For example: Ibn Al-Qayyim, Shamsuddin (d. 751 h). Ahkam Ahl al-Dhimmah, Beirut: Ramady/Ibn Hazm, 1997, vol.2, p.728, Reda, Rashid. Fatawa, Compiled by: Salahuddin Al-Munajjid and Yusuf Khouri, Beirut: Dar al-Kitab-al-Jadeed, 1390 h, Al-Qummi Al-Naisaburi, Tafsir Ghara’ib al-Qur’an, vol.3, p.459, Al-Sarakhsi, Shamsuddin (d. 483 h). Dar Al-Marifa, Beirut, without date, vol.9, p. 182, and Al-Yunini, Qutbuddin (d. 726 h). Dhail Mir’at al-Zaman, Amman: Al-Turath, without date, vol.2, p.58.

[14] For example: Al-Mawardi, Ali Ibn Mohammad (d. 450 h) Alawi al-Kabeer fi Fiqh Madhab al-Imam al-Shafie, Dar al-Kutub, Beirut, 1999, vol.14, p.267, Reda, Fatawa, Reda, Rashid. Al-Khilafah, Al-Zahraa, Cairo, without date, p.50, Al-Mawardi, Ali Ibn Mohammad (d. 450 h). Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah wal-Wilayat al-Diniyah, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, Beirut, 1985, vol..1, p.22, Al-Mawsili, Abdullah (d. 683 h). Al-Ikhtiyan, Dar al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyah, Beirut, 2005, vol.4, p.178, and Al-Qummi Al-Naisaburi, vol.3, p.459.

[15] For example: Al-Bayhaqi, vol.9, p.16, Al-Kasani, Alauddin(d. 587 h). Bada’i` al-Sana’i` fi Tartib al-Shara’i`, Dar al-Kitab al-`Arabi, Beirut, 1982, vol.7, p.131, Al-Sarakhsi, vol.9, p. 182.

[16] For example: Ibn Taymiyah, Ahmad (d. 728 h). Al-Nubuwat, Al-Matba`ah Al-Salafiyah, Cairo, 1386 h, vol.1, p.197, Al-Razi, Mohammad Ibn Omar (d. 606 h). Al-Mahsul, Jamiat Al-Imam, Riyad, 1400 h, vol.4. p.43, Al-Mawardi, Ali Ibn Mohammad (d. 450 h). Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah wal-Wilayat al-Diniyah, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, Beirut, 1985, vol..1, p.275, Al-Nasa’i, Ahmad, (d. 303 h). Al-Jum`ah, Al-Turath, Amman, without date, p.10, Al-Kalabadhi Al-Bukhari, Abu-Bakr (d. 384 h). Bahr al-Fawa’id, Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyah, Beirut, 1999, vol.1, p.130, Al-Mawardi, Ali Ibn Mohammad (d. 450 h) Al-Hawi al-Kabeer fi Fiqh Madhab al-Imam al-Shafie, Dar al-Kutub, Beirut, 1999, vol.2, p.48, Ibn Al-Arabi, Abu BAkr (d 543 h). Ahkam al-Quran, Dar al-Fikr, Lebanon, vol.1, p.368, Ibn Al-Arabi, Abu BAkr (d 543 h). Ahkam al-Quran, Dar al-Fikr, Lebanon, vol.1, p.530, Al-Kasani, Alauddin(d. 587 h). Bada’i` al-Sana’i` fi Tartib al-Shara’i`, Dar al-Kitab al-`Arabi, Beirut, 1982, vol.7, p.113, Al-Razi, Mohammad Ibn Omar (d. 604 h). Al-Tafsir Al-Kabeer, Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyah, Beirut, vol.32, p.108, Al-Mawsili, Abdullah (d. 683 h). Al-Ikhtiyan, Dar al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyah, Beirut, 2005, vol.4, p.178, Al-Yunini, Qutbuddin (d. 726 h). Dhail Mir’at al-Zaman, Al-Turath, Amman, without date, vol.2, p.58, Ibn Taymiyah, Ahmad (d. 728 h). Kutub wa Rasa’il wa Fatawa, Maktabat Ibn Taymiyah, without date, vol.23, p.146, and Ibn Taymiyah, Kutub wa Rasa’il wa Fatawa, Maktabat Ibn Taymiyah, vol.28, p.408.

[17] For example: Ibn Taymiyah, Ahmad (d. 728 h). Kutub wa Rasa’il wa Fatawa, Maktabat Ibn Taymiyah, without date, vol.28, p.146, Reda, Al-Khilafah, p.50, 62, Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah, vol.1, p.22, Al-Sarakhsi, Shamsuddin (d. 483 h). Al-Usul, Dar Al-Marifa, Beirut, without date, vol.9, p. 182, Al-Kasani, Alauddin(d. 587 h). Bada’i` al-Sana’i` fi Tartib al-Shara’i`, Dar al-Kitab al-`Arabi, Beirut, 1982, vol.7, p.80, Ibn Qudamah, Abdullah Al-Maqdisi (d. 620 h). Al-Mughni fi Fiqh al-Imam Ahmad, Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, 1405 h, vol.9, p.14, Al-Nawawi, Muhammad (d. 676 h). Rawdat al-Talibin wa `Umdat al-Muftim, Al-Maktab Al-Islami, Beirut, 1405 h, vol.10, p.49, Al-Zar`i, Mohmmad Ibn Abu Bakr (d. 751h). Al-Jawab al-Kafi Liman Sa`al `an al-Dawa’ al-Shafi, Dar al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyah, Beirut, 1405 h, vol.1, p.101, Ibn Abidin, Mohammad (d. 1252 h). Hashiyat Raddul-Mukhtar, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 2000, vol.4, p.45, Al-Alusi, Shihabuddin (d 1270 h). Ruh al-Ma`ani fi Tafsir al-Quran al-`Adheem, Dar Ihyaa al-Turath al-`Arabi, Beirut, without date, vol.18, p.91, Nizam, al-Sheikh. Al-Fatawa al-Hindiyah, Dar al-Fikr, 1991, vol.2, p.179, Reda, Rashid. Al-Khilafah, Al-Zahraa, Cairo, without date, p.50.
[18] For example: ref 1, 4, 5, 12, 32. Ibn Al-Qayyim, Ahkam Ahl al-Dhimmah, vol.2, p.728, Reda, Fatawa, Al-Qummi Al-Naisaburi, vol.3, p.459, Al-Sarakhsi, vol.9, p. 182, and Al-Yunini, Dhail Mir’at al-Zaman, vol.2, p.58.
[19] Rashid Reda, ‘Mujmal Al-Ahwal Al-Siyasiyah,’ al-‘Urwah al-Wuthqa, Feb. 29th, 1898 CE.
[20] May 1st, 2009, London City Circle, London, UK.
[21] For example: Al-Mawardi, Al-Hawi al-Kabeer, vol.14, p.267, Reda, Fatawa, Al-Qummi Al-Naisaburi, vol.3, p.459, and Al-Bayhaqi, Sunan al-Bayhaqi, vol.9, p.16.
[22] Al-Mawardi, Al-Hawi al-Kabeer, vol.14, p.267.
[23] Al-Kasani, Bada’i` al-Sana’i`, vol.7, p.131.
[24] Al-Bayhaqi, Sunan al-Bayhaqi, vol.9, p.16.
[25] Al-Qummi Al-Naisaburi, Tafsir Ghara’ib al-Qur’an, vol.3, p.459.
[26] Ibn Taymiyah, Al-Nubuwat, vol.1, p.197.
[27] Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah, vol.1, p.275.
[28] Al-Razi, Al-Mahsul, vol.4, p.43.
[29] Ibn Taymiyah, Al-Nubuwat, vol.1, p.197.
[30] Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah, vol.1, p.275, Ibn Al-Arabi, Ahkam al-Quran, vol.1, p.368, 530, Al-Razi, Al-Tafsir, vol.32, p.108, and Ibn Taymiyah, Kutub wa Rasa’il, vol.28, p.408.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibn Al-Arabi, Ahkam al-Quran, vol.1, p.530.
[34] Al-Razi, Al-Tafsir, vol.32, p.108.
[35] Al-Kalabadhi Al-Bukhari, Bahr al-Fawa’id, vol.1, p.130.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Al-Mawardi, Al-Hawi al-Kabeer, vol.2, p.48.
[38] Ibn Al-Arabi, Ahkam al-Quran, vol.1, p.368, and Ibn Taymiyah, Kutub wa Rasa’il, vol.28, p.408.
[39] Al-Kalabadhi Al-Bukhari, Bahr al-Fawa’id, vol.1, p.130.
[40] Ibid., vol.23, p.146.
[41] Ibid., vol.28, p.408, and Al-Yunini, Dhail Mir’at al-Zaman, vol.2, p.58.
[42] Al-Kasani, Bada’i` al-Sana’i`, vol.7, p.113.
[43] Al-Yunini, Dhail Mir’at al-Zaman, vol.2, p.58.
[44] For example: Ibn Taymiyah, Kutub wa Rasa’il, vol.28, p.146, Reda, Al-Khilafah, p.50, 62, Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah, vol.1, p.22, Al-Sarakhsi, al-Usul, vol.9, p. 182, Al-Kasani, Bada’i` al-Sana’i`, vol.7, p.80, Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughni, vol.9, p.14, Al-Nawawi, Rawdat al-Talibin, vol.10, p.49, Al-Zar`i, Al-Jawab al-Kafi, vol.1, p.101, Ibn Abidin, Hashiyat Raddul-Mukhtar, vol.4, p.45, Al-Alusi, Ruh al-Ma`ani, vol.18, p.91, Nizam, Al-Fatawa al-Hindiyah, vol.2, p.179, and Reda, Al-Khilafah, p.50.
[45] Reda, Ibid.
[46] Al-Mawardi, Ibid.
[47] Ibn Taymiyah, Ibid.

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Q & A bersama Dr Jasser Auda mengenai Seksualiti Merdeka

Me: Salam Dr.Audah. Currently, in Malaysia, there is an LGBTQ advocacy group called Seksualiti Merdeka (Sexual Freedom) which is demanding their rights to stage a week-long series of events to educate the public about freedom and diversity in sexual orientation. As a Muslim who considers himself as an Islamist democrat, I am rather perplexed on how to respond to this issue from an Islamic perspective. What is your take on it?

Dr. Jasser Audah: wa alikom assalam akhi. The way I respond to this question is that practicing any sexual relation outside marriage, whatever it is whether between male and female, or males, or females, or any other shape or form, are all major sins in Islam. This is a fixed Islamic principle. On the other hand, however, these people who are different could be advised (if it is not something natural that they cannot change), but they are not to be treated with violence or discriminated against. They (al-kuntha) did exist at the time of the Prophet (s) and he ignored them. They should be left alone, as long as they did not act indecently in public according to the conditions of zina (4 witnesses, etc).

Finally, banning such practices by the law should be treated in the same way zina is banned, which means that people should be left in their private life and not to be spied upon, unless they commit such a sin with 4 witnesses seeing it, etc... I hope that this is helpful.

Me: But Malaysia is a multi-religious and multi-racial country. Wouldn’t the banning of such practices be contrary to the democratic spirit? It seems to me that this is more of a clash between liberal and conservative elements in society, not necessarily Muslims and anti-Muslims.

JA: Banning such practices is 'democratic' if it comes from within the system, and not forced on it! I mean, Islamic groups and parties could campaign the way they like and for whatever 'Islamic' laws they wish. If the society and its democratic system approves such laws, then they are abiding. But if the democratic system does not convert it to a law, which will obviously be the case in Malaysia, then it remains a belief of some people and not a law. Such important changes require a clear 'consensus' of the society (or the very vast majority of it), and not just a parliamentary committee or something. This 'consensus' will never happen in Malaysia, realistically, but Islamists -and nonIslamists- do have the right to call for whatevere moral system they believe in. You see what I mean?

That is how we balance freedom and democracy, in my humble view.

Me: So the best way to balance freedom and democracy is through public rational debate? This would render courts and legal institutions secondary to the process.

JA: of course, this is the only way. And education and culture is the best way; not the law and courts

Me: Yes, but at the same time the Malaysian state is very undemocratic. The slightest issues can be manipulated and twisted by the media – which is strongly biased towards the government - to favour the government’s perspective and interests. We cannot rely on the public sphere as much compared to other democratic states

JA: well. The dictatorship mentality is the problem.
We need to fix 'dictatprship' not only in the gov but also in the people, and especially Islamic groups!

Me: Agreed. Many are expecting the general elections to happen soon inshaAllah. So what should be our priority now? Personally in the name of Islamic democracy, we have a serious problem with our moral commitments. We cannot seem to stand by our principles.

JA: i think the best approach is to say that your priorities are the welfare of Malaysia and the Malaysian people, first and before any Islamic or moral agenda, and that you will respect the multi-religious free society of Malaysia, and that you will leave the Islamic agendas to the areas of Islamic education and Islamic media, but not to the political institutions. How's that?

Tamat setakat ini, Wallahua'lam dan semoga bermanfaat.

MBH, Irbid.

*Dr Jasser Auda:

1. Ph.D. Theology & Religious Studies (Islamic Law) University of Wales Lampeter, U.K. Dissertation- Based 2008
2. Ph.D. Systems Analysis & Design (Systems Analysis) University of Waterloo, Canada Course Average: A 1996
3. M.J. Comparative Jurisprudence (Principles of Islamic Law) Islamic American University, USA GPA: 3.86/4.0 Thesis: Distinction 2004
4. B.A. Islamic Studies Islamic American University, USA GPA: 4.0/4.0 2001
5. B.Sc. Engineering Cairo University, Egypt Course Av. 83% 1988
* Classic Training: In parallel to my early engineering studies in Cairo, I attended a weekly non-degree ‘study circle’ in al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo, under the supervision of its Imam, Sheikh Ismail Sadiq al-Adawi, between 1984 and 1990, where I studied the Quran (full memorization according to Hafs narration), Bukhari and Muslim Hadith Collections (with Ibn Hajar and Nawawi commentaries), Fiqh (al-Shaf`iah), Ulum Hadith (isnad wa takhreej), and Usul Fiqh (comparative).

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